Why is this research important and how does it contribute to practice?
Auditing involves a process in which an engagement team, consisting of assistants, seniors, managers, and one or more audit partners, applies a series of sequentially performed procedures and decisions with the aim to collect sufficient competent evidence regarding the client's financial reporting process and financial statement assertions (e.g., Trotman, Bauer & Humphreys, 2015; Knechel, Vanstraelen & Zerni, 2015; Francis, 2011; Bik, 2010; Pierce & Sweeney, 2005) . Teamwork, or how individuals within engagement teams carry out their work, is therefore of crucial importance for audit quality.
Within audit firms it is common practice that assistants, seniors, managers, and audit partners are members of more than one engagement team at the same time and thus typically hold multiple team memberships (hereafter referred to as MTMs, e.g., Lopéz & Peters, 2012; Agoglia, Brazel, Hatfield & Jackson, 2010; Bik, 2010; Viator, 2001) . The idea that auditors hold MTMs means that they are concurrently members of several engagement teams in a given period of time (O'Leary, Mortensen & Wooley, 2011) . Even in a single workday, auditors may be working on a number of different tasks and may be interacting with a multitude of members of different teams (cf. Bertolotti, Matterelli, Vignolli & Macrì, 2015) . This has important, to date unacknowledged, implications for understanding what drives an individual auditor's job outcomes, the overall effectiveness of the engagement teams involved, and ultimately, audit quality. Specifically, from the literature on MTMs we know that this way of organizing work comes with certain costs as well as benefits to the individual, the team and ultimately the organization. For instance, while MTMs may create opportunities in terms of increased learning possibilities and better information exchange, it also may come with increased switching costs and higher workload.
The main contribution to practice is that we discuss implications of MTMs for auditing practice to get a better idea of why some auditors are likely to struggle, while others thrive in such a working environment. That is, we will reflect on how and under what conditions working in MTMs affect auditors' job performance.
Introduction of the research question
While insightful, research in the auditing domain seems to be based on the idea that auditors are part of one team in which all members work on a single engagement and share responsibility for the attainment of a high-quality audit (e.g., Bell, Causholli & Knechel, 2015) . However, it is important to realize that such a team model does not align with reality of how audit work is organized. As indicated multiple team memberships is the predominant way in which work within auditing firms are organized. The omnipresence of MTMs in audit firms and a current lack of understanding of how working in multiple teams simultaneously affects the performance of auditors renders it crucial to reflect on the effects of working in MTMs within audit firms. As this paper discusses some of the most pressing issues related to working in MTMs in audit firms, the outcomes contribute to existing knowledge on key drivers of audit quality (e.g., Christensen, Glover, Omer & Shelley, 2015; Bell et al., 2015; De Fond & Zhang, 2014; Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, Shefchik & Velury, 2013; Fran- 3 What does the academic literature tell us?
Auditors as a key audit quality dimension
Following the seminal work of DeAngelo (1981), audit quality has been defined as the joint likelihood that an auditor will discover and report material misstatements. Both auditor's competence and effort levels determine the likelihood that s/he discovers a material error (e.g., Bell et al., 2015) , while the likelihood that a discovered error will be reported by the auditor is affected by the auditor's independence vis-à-vis the client (e.g., De Fond & Zhang, 2014) . Various academic reviews of the literature on audit quality (e.g., Trotman et al., 2015; De Fond & Zhang, 2014; Knechel et al., 2013; Francis, 2011 Francis, , 2004 suggest that employees working at audit firms are a key determinant of audit quality. Evidence from interviews with and surveys among audit partners and staff (Christensen et al., 2015; Persellin, Schmidt & Wilkins, 2015; Westermann, Bedard & Earley, 2015) also suggests that engagement team members perform a pivotal role in securing high-quality audits. For instance, one of the interviewees in the Christensen et al. (2015, p. 17) paper clearly emphasizes employees' pivotal role by stating that "audit quality is driven by the individuals". In practice, a large number of professional organizations and regulatory bodies (e.g., NBA, 2015 NBA, , 2014 CAQ, 2014; IAASB, 2014; PCAOB, 2014) acknowledge the key role of audit firms' employees in securing high-quality audits. The IAASB (2014), for example, states that "[a] high quality audit is likely to have been achieved by an engagement team that [...] was sufficiently knowledgeable, skilled, and experienced and had sufficient time allocated to perform the audit work". In a similar vein, the PCAOB listed "workload pressures" as a potential root cause for the deficiencies they revealed in the recent past. At the same time, however, it is alarming that staffing issues are on top of the list of concerns for audit firms of all sizes because both finding and retaining qualified staff appears to be problematic (Drew, 2015) . This finding reflects significant changes in the work environment of the audit profession, and supports other research showing not only that auditors at all levels perceive their workload to be high (Persellin et al., 2015) , but also that they have become more eager to maintain a better work-life balance (e.g., Westermann et al., 2015; Johnson, Lowe & Reckers, 2012) .
Multiple team memberships in audit firms
In an attempt to use scarce human resources as efficiently as possible, audit firms rely on dynamic teams where memberships are frequently shared, shifted and dissolved (López & Peters, 2012; Bik, 2010; Pierce & Sweeney, 2005) . In practice this means that auditors hold multiple team memberships, meaning that they are simultaneously members of several engagement teams in a given period of time (O'Leary et al., 2011) . , 2011) . For instance, while a senior may be the acting manager on one engagement (involving a small(er) firm), s/he may actually mostly be conducting field work on another engagement (involving a large(r) firm). Vegt et al., 2010; O'Connor, Gruenfeld & McGrath, 1993) . Arguably, teams that are less socially-integrated are more likely to perform their work as a mere collection of individuals rather than as a coherent group with common interests (cf. Van der Vegt et al., 2010) . This means that more efforts are needed to coordinate individual work, information, and knowledge to effectively accomplish the team's objectives. Obviously, the abovementioned task-related and social demands associated with MTMs can pose a threat to an auditor's job performance that may jeopardize audit quality (e.g., Persellin et al., 2015; López & Peters, 2014; Agoglia et al., 2010; Jelinek & Jelinek, 2008; Sweeney & Summers, 2002 (Lin, 1999) . This information and network advantage facilitate actions that may increase individual and team performance (e.g., O'Leary et al., 2011; .
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Practical Implications
So far we have addressed two contrasting perspectives on MTMs. The basic message from this review of the literature is that working in multiple teams concurrently can be a double-edged sword. Therefore, in the remainder of this paper, we will reflect on the implications of MTMs for auditing practice to getter a better idea of why some auditors are likely to struggle, while others thrive in such a working environment. That is, we will reflect on how and under what conditions working in MTMs affect auditors' job performance.
Inverted U-shape relationship
It is likely that there is an inverted U-shape relationship between on the one hand job performance and, on the other, the number of simultaneous team memberships as well as the variety between team memberships. This means it is likely that job performance initially improves as the number of simultaneous team memberships increases or when team variety becomes larger because individual employees are likely to adopt more efficient working methods and are able to learn from the teams s/he is member of. However, it also means that, inevitably, there is a point at which the costs outweigh the benefits and, hence, after which job performance deteriorates. In this respect, O'Leary et al. (2011, p. 467) note "[a]s individuals take on larger numbers of teams, each additional team exacerbates the division of people's attention and slows their reengagement with any one team's work". In a similar vein, they note that after some point higher team variety is associated with greater job scope and complexity which likely leads to high levels of strain which will reduce job performance.
In an auditing context this may mean that when an individual auditor is member of a certain number of engagement teams on which s/he works simultaneously, adding one additional engagement to his/her portfolio and/or increasing the variety of teams would be detrimental to his/her performance. Specifically, it is likely that, in order to cope with the increased work load and due to an increased feeling that the job cannot be done in the allocated time (Persellin et al. 2015) , the individual auditor will more likely take shortcuts while performing audit procedures (Sundgren & Svanström, 2014) and that his/her audit judgment may be impaired. Obviously, such practices increase the possibility that existing problems will be overlooked (Persellin et al., 2015; Caramanis & Lennox, 2008) , which ultimately harm audit quality.
Also learning effects may diminish when the number of simultaneous team memberships increases beyond a certain point or when team variety becomes too great. For instance, when variety is high the diversity of inputs and information from team members becomes so varied that it becomes "unlikely to trigger any additional learning" (O'Leary et al., 2011, p. 470) . Similarly, being on too many teams simultaneously leads to increased time pressure and doesn't allow individuals to reflect on the experiences gained on the different teams and to learn from those experiences. For instance, this may imply that a senior doesn't learn on the job and benefit from the experiences and instructions from the more senior people on the engagement. Hence, this would for instance imply that the senior wouldn't be in a position to acquire skills beyond the general training he/she received. This is alarming as auditing essentially involves on-the-job learning, or "a professional "apprenticeship", in which more experienced colleagues provide guidance on how a less experienced employee should perform a task. Through this process, the apprentice is expected to learn how to translate knowledge of his/her "craft" into practice" (Westermann et al., 2015, p. 864) .
Taken together, this means that there is some optimal level of the number of simultaneous team memberships and variety between team memberships at which auditors likely thrive in an MTM-environment. It also means that to allow learning it may be important to either incorporate brief breaks (for instance of half a day) between engagements and/or to minimize the extent to which deadlines on different audit engagements culminate at one date.
While the above-mentioned saturation or inflexion point will ultimately pose limits on the number of simultaneous team memberships and/or variety between team memberships, there are some indications in the literature that individual-level characteristics in general and organizational tenure helps to alleviate the negative effects of MTMs.
The effects of organizational tenure
In terms of individual-level characteristics it seems that how individuals go about achieving their goals is likely to help explaining how individual auditors cope with MTMs in general and the task-related demands in particular. One crucial characteristic is the auditor's organizational tenure. Organizational tenure reflects an auditor's total time employed at an audit firm (cf. Conway & Coyle-Shapiro, 2012). In line with the literature about organizational socialization (e.g., Ashforth & Saks, 1996; Chatman, 1991) , higher levels of tenure captures (a) greater task familiarity, (b) improved understanding of the firm's work processes, procedures, and regulations, and (c) better awareness of the firm's implicit norms and values (Van de Brake et al., 2015; Gregersen, 1993) . These work experiences may also be relevant when coping with the task-related demands of MTMs, because they strengthen an auditor's ability to work effectively on multiple and varied tasks within the audit firm.
Auditors with lower organizational tenure need to spend substantial time and energy on learning the task requirements and implicit norms of each of their engagement teams (Ashforth & Saks, 1996) . Although this learning process is an essential element of working at an audit firm (Westermann et al., 2015) , it may also cause these auditors to experience switching costs and high work pressure because they are not yet familiar with the organizations' rules, regulations, and procedures for task accomplishment (e.g., O'Leary et al., 2011) . Hence, in the context of high MTM, it can be expected that auditors with low organizational tenure may lack the experience vital for adapting to multiple simultaneous team activities (Van de Brake et al., 2015; O'Leary et al., 2011) and will, therefore, be vulnerable to the associated task-related demands. Auditors with higher organizational tenure, on the other hand, are likely to be familiar with the tasks requirements set within the different engagement teams and to have a thorough understanding of the norms that govern interaction within these teams (Van der Brake et al., 2015) . That is, it can be expected that auditors with higher organizational tenure will find it easier to predict how a wide variety of teams will respond to their task contributions and will adapt their work behaviors more easily if needed (Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2005) . Consequently, these auditors may be less susceptible to the negative (demand) consequences of MTM. Accordingly, it is likely that the effects of MTM's task-related demands on auditor's job performance are stronger for auditors with lower organizational tenure than for auditors with higher organizational tenure.
In practical terms this could mean that the phase in an auditor's career is an important factor that explains how MTMs affects auditor effectiveness. This may solve the puzzle that while auditors in the early phases of their career probably learn and develop most from being on many different engagement teams, they also struggle the most with having to switch between those teams. Hence, this also would suggest that audit firms need to take organizational tenure into account when deciding on the number and/or variety of team memberships. For instance, audit firms could consider measures specifically attuned to early career auditors in terms of: a. the training auditors in their early phases receive (e.g., to include a session on multi-tasking/MTMs as part of the introduction program); b. staffing/planning decisions (e.g., optimal number of teams an auditor can be part of simultaneously depending on her career phase, how costs or efforts of switching between teams can be minimized, and how such switching costs can be incorporated when evaluating staff). c. to allow for real learning on the job, it may be important to incorporate some reflection time between engagements especially for the less-tenured staff members.
Conclusions
Working in multiple engagement teams simultaneously is at the heart of how auditing firms organize their employee activities. The reciprocal relationship between psycholo-
